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A
man straps a bomb to his body, walks into a crowd-
ed market, and detonates it, killing himself and
dozens of others. Is he rational? If you’re like most
people, you probably doubt it. But consider: The terrorist
has goals and acts systematically to attain them. Bruno
Frey, an economist at the University of Zurich, says this
makes him rational — and, as a result, subject to economic
analysis.
In his book, Dealing with Terrorism — Stick or Carrot?
Frey argues that conventional approaches to dealing with
terrorism are flawed. Relying on coercion — especially the
use of force against terrorists and countries that harbor
them — can be counterproductive. Instead, he would like
to see incentives used to induce terrorists to refrain from
violence and to prevent potential terrorists from joining
organizations like Al Qaeda.
Such a reorientation of policy would turn “the whole
interaction between terrorists and the government” into a
positive sum game, in which both sides benefit. The 
government would expend fewer resources on costly 
military interventions. And the terrorists would be given
an opportunity to alter their current circumstances, which
otherwise could lead to eventual incarceration or death.
Frey calls this the “economic
approach” to analyzing terrorism. Its
guiding principle is that terrorists
“compare the costs and benefits 
of alternative actions.” When the 
benefits of engaging in terrorism rise,
they engage in more of it. And when
the costs rise, they engage in less of it.
The key is to reduce the benefits that
terrorists receive from engaging in vio-
lence — and, in the process, increase
the opportunity costs of those actions.
The Proposals
Frey has three general proposals to
either reduce the frequency or effec-
tiveness of terrorism. First, to
encourage decentralization — in the
economy, government, and society
generally. A country with multiple
power centers makes a terrorist attack
less devastating. On Sept. 11, 2001, 
terrorists were able to bring down the World Trade Center
buildings, structures that were strongly associated with
Western market capitalism. In that way, it was a significant
symbolic blow. But it did not fundamentally cripple the
American economy, which is quite decentralized, with pro-
duction and decisionmaking taking place all over the
country. Countries with more centralized economies —
especially those in which government plays a strong role
and economic activity is isolated to a few geographic 
areas — would probably face greater turmoil following a
terrorist attack.
Second, to divert attention from terrorist groups.
Consider the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). It would like
to see the destruction of the state of Israel and the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state in its place. Members of the
PIJ engage in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks
to further those goals. By taking such extreme action and
having it broadcast around the world, these terrorists
believe they can sway others who believe in their cause to
support them and/or to scare those who oppose them to
seek a compromise.
Frey suggests that when such an attack occurs, the gov-
ernment should simply decline to state which particular
organization is responsible. This, he believes, would reduce
the benefits that the PIJ would reap from such an act,
because multiple groups with multiple goals, some of
which are not necessarily consistent with the PIJ’s, could
plausibly claim credit for the attack. The act itself will have
been successful, but it will have done
less to further the larger goal.
In addition, terrorist groups are
often in intense competition with
each other, even when they have 
similar beliefs. For instance, they may
compete for the same group of possi-
ble new recruits. If one organization
believes that another can “free ride”
on a terrorist attack the first group
commits, it’s less likely to commit
such an attack. By denying an organi-
zation credit for a terrorist act, you
can deny it some of the attention and
prestige it desires.
Third, to provide positive 
incentives for actual and potential 
terrorists to not engage in violent acts.
By expanding the horizons of a poten-
tial terrorist, you can decrease the
benefits and/or increase the costs of
engaging in terrorism. If you are a
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Westerners and understand their cultures and systems of
government, you may become less likely to become a 
terrorist — for at least two reasons. First, you might sym-
pathize less with Al Qaeda’s goals. This reduces the psychic
benefits you receive from joining a terrorist group. Second,
you might come to believe that it is possible to 
improve economic conditions for you and your family. 
This increases the perceived opportunity cost of engaging
in terrorism.
But how can potential terrorists actually gain such
exposure to new cultures? On a micro level, Frey argues
for a vigorous student exchange program. On a more
macro level, he argues for reducing or eliminating 
sanctions against “rogue” states in an effort to bring them
back into the international community. In addition, he
argues that repentents should be welcomed. Terrorists
who are serious about renouncing their actions and willing
to provide information about their former associates
should be given reduced punishments and guaranteed
secure futures.
But Will They Work?
Frey’s framework of analysis is persuasive. But some will
remain skeptical, and argue that terrorists just can’t be 
reasoned with in the way that Frey argues. Instead, the only
thing they understand is violence — and we must adopt
policies that recognize this ugly fact.
Is that necessarily inconsistent with an “economic
approach” to dealing with terrorism? Arguably not. By
using force or the threat of it, governments are raising the
costs of engaging in terrorist activity — do so and you face
the possibility of being killed or sent to prison. This 
clearly affects the decisionmaking process for terrorists.
It’s similar to taxing other activities deemed undesirable,
such as smoking, only the consequences are much greater. 
Military intervention, then, can be seen as broadly 
consistent with Frey’s overall strategy of relying on incen-
tives to alter behavior — although it does conflict with his
more specific proposals. It’s difficult to engage in military
action without singling out a specific organization as
responsible for terrorist activity. In addition, it’s inconsis-
tent with offering terrorists incentives to resist from
further attacks and to reintegrate them back into peaceful
society. In short, “deterrence policy is difficult to combine
with the positive approaches,” Frey offers.
Moreover, war is expensive — in terms of both blood
and treasure. Just as important, it may exacerbate the prob-
lem. By invading and then occupying foreign countries, you
can create great anger throughout a region — and, hence,
breed a whole new generation of terrorists who otherwise
might have been less receptive to joining groups like Al
Qaeda. So the use of force can raise the costs that terrorists
face, but this approach has high costs, direct as well as indi-
rect, of its own. Overall, it’s better to use carrots than
sticks, Frey argues.
Why Haven’t They Been Adopted?
If that’s true, then why do governments resort to sticks
rather than bring out the carrots? Partly, Frey argues,
because governments don’t want to be seen as weak.
Better to act quickly and forcefully in response to a 
terrorist attack than to wait and consider what would be
the most effective overall policy. (Indeed, even if 
governments do employ some of the policies that Frey
suggests, they are unlikely to make them known, lest
they be seen as appeasers. So while Frey is unable to 
offer many examples of his proposals working in practice
— something that might help persuade skeptics — 
that doesn’t necessarily mean that such examples 
don’t exist.) 
The carrot approach might also be unpopular because
some of the key agencies within government — the 
military, the intelligence community, and the police —
benefit from the use of force, Frey argues. They receive
more resources and prestige. This argument is consistent
with a standard “public choice” analysis: People in 
government are self-interested and enact policies that
benefit them and their agencies. But is it right? In the case
of U.S. antiterrorist policies, the facts don’t seem to 
support this analysis.
There certainly were important public figures who
favored going to war in Iraq, especially among civilian
members of the Departments of Defense and State. But
arguably the most prominent and articulate opponents of
intervention were some of the very people who Frey states
had an interest in going to war — military leaders, both
active and retired. They argued that the direct costs of
intervention were going to be larger than projected. They
warned that intervention would not rid the Middle East of
terrorists — that, in fact, it might increase their number.
And, finally, they argued that it was hubristic to think that
the United States could mold other countries in its image
through the use of force. 
This has significant implications for Frey’s approach to
fighting terrorism. It suggests that public opinion was
more important in the drive to war than the self-interested
behavior of government officials. The public supported
military intervention, and got it. Polls suggest that a 
majority of people are having doubts now, and this, too,
may affect the course of the war. 
This means that government doesn’t necessarily 
act according to a logic of its own, and that it’s possible 
to implement noncoercive antiterrorist measures. 
This should gratify Frey. On the other hand, it means that
he needs to convince a large share of the public that 
his approach has merit. He has his work cut out for him.
It’s one thing to believe that a specific military interven-
tion is unwise or being prosecuted badly. It’s quite another
to believe that, as a general rule, carrots can be substituted
for sticks. The former, no doubt, should be employed
more widely. But the latter, for better or worse, are a tool
that people will always be tempted to use. RF
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